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Simons: Third Party Standing for Property Tax Assessments: Tug Valley Rec

THIRD PARTY STANDING FOR PROPERTY
TAX ASSESSMENTS: TUG VALLEY
RECOVERY CENTER, INC. v. MINGO
CTY COMM'N
The West Virginia Constitution requires that ad valorem
taxation rates be "uniform and equal throughout the State,"'
both as among items of the same type of property and as among
the four different classes of property.2 By statute the county
assessor must use the property's "true and actual value" as the
basis for appraisals made for assessment purposes.' This guarantees, at least in theory, uniform and equal treatment to taxpayers as well as uniform and equal revenues flowing to county
governments to fund vital services, primarily education. Should
taxpayers feel that their properties are being taxed proportionately higher than similar property owned by their neighbors
they may, and have, resorted to administrative and judicial
remedies to have their assessments lowered to a level equal
with others.4
W. VA. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
'In re Assessment of Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W.Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649
(1959).
W. VA. CODE § 11-3-1 (1974 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25 (1974 Replacement Vol.) provides for review of
assessments, after petition to the county board of equalization and reivew, in a de
novo hearing before the circuit court. See also In re Assessment of Kanawha
Valley Bank, 144 W.Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959); In re Pocahontas Land Corp.,
210 S.E.2d 641 (W.Va. 1974); In re U.S. Steel, 268 S.E.2d 128 (W.Va. 1980). In
Kanawha Valley Bank the petitioners contended that their shares of stock were
being appraised and assessed at 100% of their cash value while other classes of
property in the county were valued at a much lower percentage. Testimony of the
county assessor revealed that residential lots were valued at roughly 35% of
their true value. The court ordered the bank's assessment reduced to a level commensurate with that of other classes of property. In PocahontasLand the court invalidated a county assessor's attempt to cover the county's budget deficit by arbitrarily raising the assessments of the county's twenty largest property holders.
In the U.S. Steel case petitioner's property was appraised at 108% of the state
tax commissioner's valuation, while similar property in the county was appraised
at only 68% of the commissioner's figure. The court reversed the circuit court's
order (which had reduced the appraisal to 100% of that figure), and ruled that
U.S. Steers appraised value should be no higher than that of similar properties in
the county.
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A recent state supreme court decision attempts to achieve
taxation based on "true and actual value" by allowing county
residents to compel examination of the appraisal and assessment
of any property in the county, including property held by third
parties. The court ruled that the residents' interests in services
provided by the county conferred standing sufficient for them to
maintain an action to insure that all taxpayers in the county
were taxed uniformly and equally. Tug Valley Recovery Center,
Inc. v. Mingo County Commission and Lincoln Citizens for Tax
Reform v. Abraham,' were suits by taxpayers' groups6 seeking
to compel higher assessments of large landholders' interests in
their respective counties.'
Mineral estates in flood-ravaged Mingo County were assessed
at the time at an average value of $18.00 an acre, while the state
tax commissioner's report for that year suggested a value of
$168.00 an acre; by the time of the decision the tax
commissioner's valuation had risen to $360.00 an acre. In Lincoln
County, the average assessed value of all mineral interests was
only $5.06 per acre. In Mingo County one corporation owned or
held interests in 39,000 acres; in Lincoln County a few companies held large amounts of land or interests in land, including

5 261 S.E.2d 165 (W.Va. 1979). The cases were consolidated for argument and
decision because of their legal similarity.
' Petitioner Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc., a registered corporation with
tiLe State of West Virginia, owns property and pays taxes in its own name. Id. at
167. Petitioner Lincoln Citizens for Tax Reform, unincorporated and not a taxpaying property owner, was composed of some twenty members, nearly all
residential taxpayers and parents of school-age children. Id. at 168.
' Tug Valley could be considered the latest expression of taxpayer's unhappiness with local property tax structures as they relate to funding county services, especially in their role as the local component of educational support funding. In Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979), cited by the court in Tug
Valley, parents of school-age Lincoln County children sought a declaratory judgment on the claim that the existing system, basing the amount of state educational aid on the amount of that county's property tax revenues, denied citizens of
poorer counties the "thorough and efficient" education required in Art. 12, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution. Id. at 861. While the supreme court
recognized a "thorough and efficient" education a fundamental constitutional
right in the state, the case was remanded for further development of the facts. It
is interesting that Justice Neely, though moved by the "woeful" condition of Lincoln County schools, chose to dissent in Pauley, recognizing the political nature of
the issue. Id. at 897. Tug Valley was decided without a single dissent.
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Columbia Gas Company, which owned 78%
terests in the county.'

of all mineral in-

After denial of their petitions by their county commissions,
both associations sought the judicial review authorized by West
Virginia Code section 11-3-25' to compel county officials to revise
their mineral estates valuations.' The Mingo County Circuit
Court granted a motion to dismiss the petition, expressly
holding that plaintiff Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. lacked
standing sufficient to maintain the action. The Circuit Court of
Lincoln County specifically declined to rule on whether the petitioners had standing to bring the action. It did, however, order
the county's assessments increased for the next tax year, postponing immediate action on the belief that the court could not
set tax rates, especially when the landowner was not before the
court."
Upon appeals by the citizens' groups the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and Justice
McGraw, writing the opinion, framed the issues:
First, does an interested resident or taxpayer have standing to
contest the assessment of land not belonging to him? Secondly,
to what extent does a circuit court have the power to set tax
rates when the responsibility and duty to do so have been
neglected by the Board of Equalization and Review?"
These issues and the court's holding will be reviewed separately.
I. STANDING OF THIRD PARTIES
The court determined that the petitioners had standing to
maintain the actions by recognizing that "if one party is
261 S.E.2d 165, 167-68 (W. Va. 1979).
(1974 Replacement Vol.).
,0Plaintiff Tug Valley Recovery Center introduced various evidence in support of their claim of undervaluation, including the state tax commissioner's coal
value appraisals, before the county board of equalization and review. At that
meeting the board indicated that the petition would be granted, but ten days
later apparently reconsidered and decided that reappraisal would be delayed until
the following year. 261 S.E.2d at 168. The Lincoln County board similarly declined

to raise their mineral estates assessments until the following year, stating that
they believed there was not sufficient time to do so legally. Id.
"
"

Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
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underassessed, the resulting injury is to all other members of
the taxing district who are discriminatorily assessed and denied
the benefits of full and equitable taxation."' 3 Justice McGraw
relied upon two statutes, read in pari materia,to grant standing
to the petitioners: West Virginia Code Section 11-3-25," dealing
with review of property assessments by circuit courts upon motion of "any person aggrieved by any assessment"; and West
Virginia Code Section 18-9A-11,"5 part of a comprehensive plan
for support of public schools.
It is questionable, however, whether the two statutes should
properly be read in pari materia. Although Section 18-9A-11
specifically states that it is "not to be construed to alter or
repeal in any manner the provisions of chapter eleven of this
Code, but shall be construed in pari materia therewith,"'" to be

Id. at 172.
(1974 Replacement Vol.). This section provides in part:
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by any assessment in any
land or personal property book of any county who shall have appeared
and contested the valuation or whose assessment has been raised by the
county court above the assessment fixed by the assessor, or who contested the classification or taxability of his property may, at any time
up to thirty days after the adjournment of the county court, apply for
relief to the circuit court of the county in which such books are made
out; ....
"
"

Id.
(1977 Replacement Vol.). This section provides in part:
In any year in which the total assessed valuation of a county shall
fail to meet the minimum requirements above set forth, the county
court of such county shall allocate for such year to the county board of
education from the tax levies as will, when applied to the valuations for
assessment purposes of such property in the county, provide a sum of
money equal to the difference between the amount of revenue which
will be produced by application of the allowable school levy rates defined
in ...[§ 18-9A-2] ...upon the valuations for assessment purposes of
such property and the amount of revenue which would be yielded by
the application of such levies to fifty percent of the total of appraised
valuations of such property. In the event the county court shall fail or
refuse to make the reallocation of levies as provided for herein, the
county board of education, the tax commissioner, the state board, or
any other interested party, shall have the right to enforce the same by
writ of mandamus in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
16

Id.
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so read, the court requires that two statutes "must not be in
17
conflict and must relate to the same general subject."
While sections 11-3-25 and 18-9A-11 arguably relate to the
same general subject of taxation, the specific passages used by
the court have purposes distinctly different. "Any person claiming to be aggrieved" in section 11-3-25 relates to taxpayer appeals of property assessments before circuit courts, after petioning the county board.' "Any other interested party" in section
18-9A-11 does not deal with review, appeal, or reappraisal of
individual assessments at all.'9 Thus, while sections 11-3-25 and
18-9A-11 might be said to relate to the same general subject,
synthesis of the two phrases relied on by the court does not
come to hand quite as readily as the opinion indicates.
In support of its "standing" holding, the Tug Valley court
cited decisions from the United States Supreme Court and one
federal circuit court," asserting that "[v]iewed in this light, the
concrete and unmistakable interest of the petitioners becomes
crystal clear."" However, the Supreme Court and federal circuit
decisions cited by the court did not involve any direct attempt
by a taxpayer to compel an increase in the valuation of a third
party's property; rather the taxpayers were attempting to win a
decrease in their own assessments by pointing to exempt or undervalued classes of other taxpayers. In those situations the
courts declined to raise the assessments of the other taxpayers
(large, populous classes as opposed to one or a few in Tug
Valley), holding that such a remedy would be inconvenient and
impractical.'
" 261 S.E.2d 165, 170, (1979) citing State ex rel. Miller v. Locke, 253 S.E.2d
540 (W. Va. 1979) and Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 244 S.E.2d
321 (W. Va. 1978).
" (1974 Replacement Vol.).
(1977 Replacement Vol.). Although the statute is the basic operating
statute of the state tax commissioner's office, the powers attributed to that office
have never been fully reviewed by the state supreme court.
- 261 S.E.2d 165, 171-73, citing Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933);
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U.S. 23 (1931); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota
County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923); Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield Township, 247
U.S. 350 (1918); Dundee Mortgage Trust Invest. Co. v. Charlton, 32 F. 192 (C.C.D.
Or. 1887).
"1 261 S.E.2d at 172.
22Id.
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While the cited cases do stand for the court's general proposition that all members of a taxing district are injured by the
underassessment of one property owner, these cases rejected
the remedy applied by the court in Tug Valley. The court in fact
cited only one applicable case as authority for its grant of standing to persons other than the taxpayer whose assessment is
questioned.'
A survey of this and other case law reveals that such thirdparty suits have been sustained in a majority of the jurisdictions
that have entertained the question; but the decisions have, as a
rule, done so or refused to do so on the basis of language in
assessment-review statutes only. 4 The court did initially
observe that the "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning" of
"any person aggrieved" in section 11-3-25 would include taxpayers' groups like the petitioners, but failed to acknowledge that
other jurisdictions have reached the same result on the basis of
similar, or even less accomodating, language alone.25 Consideration of these precedents would have afforded a much-needed opportunity for the court to define the parameters of its grant of
standing and the situations where it may properly be asserted.
' Board of County Comm'rs v. Buch, 190 Md. 394, 58 A.2d 672 (1948). The
Tug Valley court alsocursorily cited two other relevant cases under a "compare"

signal but declined to analyze, discuss, or distinguish them. See 261 S.E.2d 165,
173, citing State ex rel. Hepperla v. Glander, 160 Ohio St. 59, 113 N.E.2d 357
(1953) and Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W. 237 (1940).
U See Board of County Commissioners v. Buch, 190 Md. 394, 58 A.2d 672
(1948); Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa, 22, 294 N.W.237 (1940); Ryan v. Douglas County
Bd. of Equalization, 199 Neb. 291, 258 N.W.2d 626 (1977). See also Pulaski County

v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 210 Ark. 124, 194 S.W.2d 883 (1946); State ex rel. Hepperla v. Glander, 160 Ohio St. 59, 113 N.E.2d 357 (1953); Southern Ry. Co. v. Clenient, 57 Tenn. App. 54, 415 S.W.2d 146 (1966); Appeal of Bosley, 29 N.D. App. 468,
224 S.E.2d 686 (1976).
2

See, e.g., MD. TAX & REV. CODE ANN. § 81-255 (Any taxpayer... may de-

mand a hearing ... as to the assessment of any property .... "); IOWA CODE §§
441.13, 441.26, 661.1, 661.9 (general provisions for writ of mandamus); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 25-21, 154 (declaratory judgment available to "any person . .. whose
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected ... ."); ARK. STAT. ANN. §

84-708 ("Any property owner may ... apply ... for the adjustment of the assessment of his own property or that of another person .... "); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5719.19 ("Any taxpayer may file such a complaint as to... his own or another's
real property...."); TENN. CODE ANN. 67-806(3) ("Property other than property

owned by the taxpayer..."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-322(g)(2) ("his property or the
property of others.").
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The scope of the standing recognized by Tug Valley seems
almost limitless. The only limitation even implied in the opinion
is "every citizen, every person affected by the tax base."2
Although petitioner Tug Valley Recovery Center was an incorporated association, owning property and paying taxes in its
own right, Lincoln Citizens for Tax Reform was not and paid no
taxes as a group. Thus, one apparently need not pay property
taxes to a county to contest that county's assessment practices.
The opinion in Tug Valley speaks of consumers of county services, not those who fund them.
Perhaps legislative or judicial action will eventually limit
this grant to some extent. Absent some further restriction, it
seems the only barrier between a possibly vexatious plaintiff
and legal problems for the subject of his complaint is the cost of
beginning the litigation, whether the claim is ultimately as
meritorious as that in Tug Valley or not.
II.

DUTY OF CIRCUIT COURTS TO ADJUST ASSESSMENTS

Having determined that petitioners had the requisite standing to maintain the action, the Tug Valley court returned to its
second issue: "to what extent does a circuit court have the
power to set tax rates when the responsibility and duty to do so
have been neglected by the Board of Equalization and Review."'
Justice McGraw wrote:
It is incumbent upon the circuit court, as it would be upon the
county commission and the assessor, to set the assessed value
of all parcels of land at the amount established by the State Tax
Commissioner.
[T]hat appraisalis to serve as the basis for determining true
and actual value for all assessment purposes Therefore, once
the Tax Commissioner's appraisal has been made, the duty of
the circuit court is clear and the taking of further evidence
would not be necessary.'
These observations were based on the court's construction
of section 18-9A-11, which it had relied on earlier to resolve peti261 S.E.2d 165, 171 (1979).
Id. at 169.
Id. at 173.
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tioners' standing problems. However, the actual language of the
statute provides, in pertinent part: "the county assessor and the
county court, sitting as a board of equalization and review, shall
use such appraised valuations as a basis for determining the
true and actual value for assessment purposes ...."2 This sec-

tion related to the duties the statute imposes on those county officials. The Tug Valley court, however, imposes this standard on
the circuit court sitting as a court, the court further ruled that, if
an appraisal by the Tax Commissioner was available, "the taking of futher evidence would not be necessary.""0 The statute,
however, continues: "The total assessed valuation ... shall not be

less than fifty percent nor more than one hundred percent of the
3 1 The court, in holding that the tax
appraised valuation ....
commissioner's figure was to be "the basis," rather than "a
basis" thus denied the circuit court the discretionary range the
statute allows to assessors. Certainly the commissioner's appraisal should be compelling evidence but, in the language of the
statute, "evidence" is its only function. The Mingo County Circuit Court did in fact set the assessment at the tax commissioner's figure, but only after hearing testimony from the county
assessor and the property owner, and after the tax commissioner's latest appraisal set the value at $360.00 per acre.
III. THE AFTERMATH AND IMPLICATIONS OF
TUG VALLEY

In analyzing the possible long-term effects of Tug Valley,
the most significant aspect of the decision is the extent of the
court's expansion of standing to review property assessments.
The court's language, "every person affected by the tax base, 32
could conceivably allow bus passengers, inmates of the county
jail, or any other person receiving county services to obtain
review of any property tax assessment, with a statutory right to
de novo appeal to the circuit court." Clearly the holding seems
salutory in its application to the situations presented by the
petitioners, but precisely such an observation begs the question:
W. VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 (1977 Replacement Vol.) (emphasis added).

261 S.E.2d at 173.
31 W.

VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 (1977 Replacement Vol.).

261 S.E.2d at 171.
33

W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25 (1974 Replacement Vol.).
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Would the court have been as willing to acknowlege the petitioners' interests if the case had not involved flood-ravaged Mingo
County and Lincoln County with its "woeful" schools?4 Or if

there had been more than a single, or a few, large landholders
involved?
The somewhat diverse occupations of the land, coal, and
utility companies involved in Tug Valley notwithstanding, it
seems the most frequent target of such suits would probably be
the state's coal and coal-related concerns, many of whom are
presently ill-equipped to bear any additional tax burdens. In
relatively more optimistic times one author, forseeing a bright
future for the state's coal in the wake of the first OPEC oil embargo, nevertheless warned against taxing the industry too
heavily:
[A]s of 1973, West Virginia was decidely a high tax state
[relative to surrounding coal-producing states] insofar as the
bituminous coal industry was concerned ....

If the output and

profitability of this key industry rise as anticipated . . .
pressures may quickly develop for further increases in the level
at which coal is taxed in the State. The message of the present
study is simply this: Let us proceed with caution; "King Coal" is
already bearing a relatively heavy tax burden."'
When that passage was written, property taxes accounted
for just under ten percent of the total tax bill of an "average"
West Virginia coal company, the remainder being largely attributable to state corporate income or business and occupation
taxes. 6 Should, however, the "average" coal company's property
tax assessments rise as much in two years as did the Mingo
County property owner's (roughly 1000o), their disastrous effects would be plain. It is hoped that very few properties are as
greatly underassessed as the mineral interests involved in Tug
Valley, but even a smaller increase could be considered substantial. Moreover, in 1975 the legislature has imposed a new tax
under the state's business and occupation tax on coal companies,

Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 899 (W. Va. 1979).
Thompson, State and Local Taxation of the Bituminous Coal Industry, 76
W. VA. L. REV. 297, 321 (1974).

1 Id. at 323.
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with 75%/ of the proceeds to be refunded proportionately to the
respective counties.'
It seems, therefore, as if "pressures [have] quickly developed. '"' In Tug Valley's controversy, that being conflict between the majority, those consuming tax-funded services, and
the minority, those funding the services, at least one thing
seems clear: achieving "uniform and equal" taxation is a noble
goal, but a difficult task.
Kenneth P. Simons, II

W. VA. CODE § 11-13-21 (Cum. Supp. 1980). This section imposes an additional tax on the severance extraction and production of coal "equal to the value
of the coal produced as shown by the gross proceeds derived from the sale thereof
by the producer multiplied by thirty-five one hundredths of one percent ..... Id.
I Thompson, supra note 35, at 321.
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